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COMMENTS
The ideal, of course, would be to allow municipalities primary jurisdic-
tion in matters concerning their own particular interest, without letting
their sometime pedestrian concern destroy effective, progressive statewide
legislation. Whether or not this can be effectuated remains ultimately in
the hands of the courts. In light of the state constitutional limitation of "in-
consistency,"T7 the courts must determine the basis for invalidating local
legislation by weighing the advantages of both municipal and state control
of the particular area. Without acceptance of this responsibility, the power
will rest totally with the state, as it does now,78 or totally with the munici-
pality, as it would after constitutional revision. Neither one of these pros-
pects seems particularly advantageous.
ARTHUR F. DOBSON, JR.
THE NON-CONSENSUAL KILLING OF AN UNBORN INFANT:
A CRIMINAL ACT?
I. INTRODUCTION
In Keeler v. Superior Court, the defendant, convinced that his wife
was pregnant with another man's child, assaulted her exclaiming, "I'm
going to stomp it out of you."' Proceeding to do just that, he repeatedly
kicked the woman in the abdomen and killed the almost full-term fetus.
In response to his resultant prosecution for murder, Keeler sought a writ
of prohibition to stay prosecution on the ground that the fetus was not a
human being within the meaning of the California homicide statute. 2
The ensuing courtroom battles revolved around the question of when
a fetus becomes a human being for purposes of the criminal law. Debate
on this question is possessed of a long history and is indicative of a con-
tinuing inability to resolve the legal implications of the killing of an unborn
child.
II. HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS
A. Pre-Common Law
Certain primitive cultures determined whether a crime had been com-
mitted in respect to the killing of an unborn infant by considering the
factors of convenience and necessity.3 For example, a wife's fear that her
77. N.Y. CONST. art. 9, § 2(c)(2).
78. Comment, Home Rule and the New York Constitution, 66 CoLum. L. REv. 1145,
1149 (1966).
1. 2 Cal. 3d 619, -, 470 P.2d 617, 618, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481, 482 (1970).
2. Id. at -, 470 P.2d at 618, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 482.
3. For a complete history of primitive societies' treatment of the killing of an
unborn infant, see Quay, Justifiable Abortion -Medical and Legal Foundations, 49 GEo.
L.J. 395 (1961).
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husband would be unfaithful while she was rearing the infant, was thought
to be justification for killing the fetus. 4 For similar reasons an ancient
Athenian mother could kill her child at any time prior to the completion
of a required ceremony, since the child was not counted "as a full human
being or a member of the tribe until [the] ceremony ha[d] been performed."5
On the other hand, even those societies that protected the fetus did not
necessarily do so for religious or moral reasons. The early Hebrews and
ancient Spartans "enacted severe penalties, sometimes even death, for de-
struction of the ... fetus," solely to deter anyone from killing a potential
worker or warrior.6
In Europe during the Middle Ages, canon lawyers and theologians
fixed the moment of a fetus' entrance into humanity "at forty days after
conception, in the case of a male fetus, and eighty days in the case of a
female fetus." 7
B. Common Law
The early common law rejected the distinction between a male and
female fetus and attached significance to fetal quickening.8 Destruction of
a fetus prior to quickening was not a crime while destruction of a quickened
fetus was a high crime.9 Quickening is defined as "[t]he first motion of the
foetus in the womb felt by the mother, occurring usually about the middle
of ... pregnancy."' 0 Lack of medical knowledge may have been one factor
in making the stage of quickening legally significant, since quickening was
determinable, at least by the mother, in a time when little else about a
fetus was readily understood.
The common law had difficulty with the quickening test and by the
mid-nineteenth century, it shifted to the "born alive" theory, which required
that the child be born alive in order for it to be afforded the protection
of a homicide statute." There are several reasons why the common law
turned to the "born alive" theory. First, it is arguable that the stage of
medical science at the time "gave rise to a presumption that the child would
4. G. WILLIAMS, Tim SANCTrrY or Lum AND ThE CRIMINAL LAWv 14 (1966).
5. Id. The ceremony in Athens consisted of the exposure of the child before "a
family ceremony at which the child was carried by its nurse around the hearth and
thus received religious consecration and its name."
6. Leavy & Kummer, Criminal Abortion: A Failure of Law, 50 A.B.A.J. 52, 53
(1964).
7. Means, The Law Of New York Concerning Abortion And The Status Of The
Foetus, 1664-1968: A Case Of Cessation Of Constitutionality, 14 N.Y.L.F. 411-12 (1968).
8. See State v. Patterson, 105 Kan. 9, 10, 181 P. 609, 610 (1919).
9. See Means, supra note 7, at 438, citing Evans v. People, 49 N.Y. 86, 88 (1872).
10. BLAcK's LAW DiCrIoNaRY 1415 (4th ed. 1951).
11. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 29 (2d ed. 1969).
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not be born alive .. .-12 probably because of a high mortality rate among
infants in the pre-natal and birth stages. Second, the "mother during the
process of birth was not [considered] a . . rational [human] being; I3
therefore she was capable of destroying the fetus through irrational con-
duct1 4 and would be excused by the criminal law. Third, there were
"difficult evidentiary problem[s] [in] determining the cause of the infant's
non-survival."'u
The "born alive" theory, however, did not resolve existing problems
and at times created new ones. Courts usually held that if the evidence of
being born alive "[was] susceptible of reasonable doubt, corpus delicti [was]
not proved, and a conviction [could] not be sustained."' 6 The cutting of the
umbilical cord was not sufficient proof of being born alive nor was the
factor of breathing alone indicative of self-existence. 17 There was great
disagreement over what evidence was necessary to establish the complete
independent existence of the child. Consequently, the prosecution in homi-
cide cases sometimes had difficulty in proving that the infant was born alive.
Moreover, the common law requirement that a child be "bo-n alive" some-
times produced unconscionable results. According to the theory, no part of
the child could remain in the mother. Thus, where defendant stabbed the
baby in the head with a fork during birth or where the infant was
strangled upon presentation of the head, but before the child was expelled,
there was no murder; nor was the crime of abortion (without the consent
of the mother) committed, since the child was born in the natural course
of events.' 8
The born alive theory was the prevailing law in England until the
passage of the Infanticide Acts of 1922 and 1938.19 These acts, along with
the British Infant Life Preservation Act of 1929, were the statutory ap-
proach to filling the gap between the crimes of abortion and murder.20
The statutes were directed at "[a]ny person who with intent to destroy the
life of a child capable of being born alive, by any wilful act cause[d] a
child to die, before it ha[d] an existence independent of its mother," and
12. Note, 20 S. CAL. L. REv. 357, 358 (1947).
13. Id.
14. See Singleton v. State, 33 Ala. App. 536, 35 So. 2d 375 (1948).
15. Note, supra note 12, at 358, citing State v. Winthrop, 43 Iowa 519, 22 Am. R.
257 (1876)."
16. Note, supra note 12, at 359, citing State v. Williams, 52 N.C. 446, 78 Am. Dec.
248 (1860).
17. See generally State v. Winthrop, 43 Iowa 519, 22 Am. R. 257 (1876).
18. See G. WiLLAMS, supra note 4, at 5-6; See also Note, supra note 12, at 359, for
a discussion of two early English cases involving these facts.
19. See Winfield, The Unborn Child, 8 CAMB. L.J. 76, 78-81 (1944).
20. See G. WLIAMs, supra note 4, at 12.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
violation of the statute was punishable with imprisonment for life.21 The
words "capable of being born alive" are what the American courts would
probably equate with "viability"22 which is defined as having a "[c]apability
of living."23 The Infanticide Acts of 1922, 1929 and 1938 were somewhat
ambiguous since they required that the infant be "capable of being born
alive" yet they were addressed at acts committed before the child had an
"individual existence of its own." While viability occurs in the latter part
of pregnancy,2 4 it has been argued that a child has an individual existence
of its own from the time of conception. 25 If this argument can be accepted
it is inconsistent with the statute, which requires the child to be viable,
before it has an independent existence of its own.
C. Early American Case Law
The American courts followed the English common law, adopting its
inconsistencies and ambiguities. They required live birth, even though
there was existing disagreement over when the life begins.20 There was
rampant dissension over the significance of respiration, circulation, severance
of the placenta and other like factors used in determining when independent
existence begins.27
III. THE FAILURE OF COMMON LAW
Modern case law indicates that the common law is not adequate to
determine what crime, if any, a defendant has committed by killing an un-
born infant. In People v. Chavez,28 the defendant was convicted of man-
slaughter for failure to use due care during child birth, which failure re-
sulted in the death of her baby. The effect of this decision was to give
human status to the infant at any time during child birth. The court
attempted to formulate a test by which an infant could be the subject of a
homicide statute. Presiding Justice Barnard said:
There is no sound reason why an infant should not be considered
a human being when born or removed from the body of its
mother, when it has reached that stage of development where it
21. Id.
22. See People v. Chavez, 77 Cal. App. 2d 621, 625-26, 176 P.2d 92, 9- (4th Dist.
1947).
23. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1737 (4th ed. 1951).
24. Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 431, 114 N.E.2d 412, 417 (1953), citing STE-MAN,
MEDICAL DIMONARY, 1234 (16th ed. Taylor, 1946).
25. E.g., Byrn, Abortion in Perspective, 5 DUQUESNE L. Rtv. 125, 126 (1966).
26. See Montgomery v. State, 202 Ga. App. 678, 44 S.E.2d 242 (1947); Shedd v.
State, 178 Ga. 653, 173 S.E. 847 (1934); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 265 Ky. 295, 96
S.W.2d 1014 (1936); Morgan v. State, 148 Tenn. App. 417, 256 S.W. 433 (1933); State v.
Merrill, 72 W. Va. 500, 78 S.E. 699 (1931).
27. See cases cited supra note 26.
28. 77 Cal. App. 2d 621, 176 P.2d 92 (4th Dist. 1947).
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is capable of living an independent life as a separate being and
where in the natural course of events it will so live if given normal
and reasonable care.2 9
The court was obviously proposing viability, possessing a "capability of
living,"30 as a new test or standard for applying the law of homicide.
Nevertheless, in another jurisdiction, one year later, in Singleton v.
State,31 a conviction, for murder in the second degree, was reversed where
the defendant was accused of failing to use due care to prevent the death
of her child. The court held that "[a]n element additional to the required
elements of the usual homicide case must be established by the State beyond
a reasonable doubt, namely that the deceased babe was born alive."3 2 The
court was not willing to follow Chavez even to the extent of protecting the
fetus during childbirth, for it said, "this court is unwilling to attach crim-
inality to non-feasant acts of a mother... during the travail of childbirth
even though such nonaction result[s] in the death of [a] baby."3 3 The
rationale of the court is ambiguous; although it refused to find the mother
culpable, it lauded the Chavez ruling and concluded that the "State met
the burden of proof cast upon it to establish that the infant in the present
case was born alive."a34 If the court found the infant to be born alive, yet
the killing non-criminal, it is unclear why it lauded Chavez but refused to
follow its holding and find the defendant guilty.
The trend of the law in this area is unpredictable. In State v. Dickin-
sonS5 the defendant was convicted in the lower court of vehicular homi-
cide in the criminally negligent killing of a seven month old viable fetus.
This case is significant for two reasons: first, it is the only case in which
the defendant was convicted of homicide for an unintentional killing of a
viable fetus, and second, the Ohio court may have attempted to redefine the
law on killing an unborn infant. The court, to a great extent, used civil
case law as precedent, relying heavily on Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit,
Inc.36 where an infant was allowed to recover for prenatal injuries inflicted
during its stage of viability. Beyond the possible impropriety of the criminal
law using civil law as precedent, the cases are dearly not analogous (except
for the fact that both fetuses received injuries in the prenatal stage) because
the child in Williams survived outside the mother while the child in
29. Id. at 625-26, 176 P.2d at 94.
30. BLACK'S LAW DiriONARY 1737 (4th ed. 1951).
31. 33 Ala. App. 536, 35 So. 2d 375 (1948).
32. Id. at 540, 35 So. 2d at 378.
33. Id. at 543, 35 So. 2d at 381.
34. Id. at 541, 35 So. 2d at 379.
35. 18 Ohio Misc. 151, 248 N.E.2d 458 (1969).
36. 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949).
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Dickinson was destroyed in its prenatal stage. The court also relied on
Jasinsky v. Potts37 where a wrongful death action was allowed following the
death of an infant from prenatal injuries. This also is questionable pre-
cedent because the infant lived for three months after birth, thus there
was no doubt that the infant could be considered a human being. According
to Professor Prosser a "slight majority" of states allow a wrongful death
action for killing of a viable fetus. 38 Such legislative or judicial determin-
ations, however, may not be sufficient for the criminal law to use as prece-
dent, since wrongful death is a civil action to compensate for pecuniary loss
while homicide is a crime, prosecuted by the state with sanctions of extreme
severity, one of which could be death. In addition, it would be improper
for criminal law to use civil law as precedent, since an appellate court
would be relying on cases in which the burden of proof is a mere prepon-
derance of evidence and not proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The questionable rationale of Dickinson in relying on civil law, pre-
cluded it from being used as precedent in other cases involving the killing
of a viable fetus and may have served as one of the reasons for its very recent
reversal by the Ohio Court of Appeals.3 9 The Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia in Keeler v. Superior Court40 (decided prior to the Dickinson rever-
sal) by not citing Dickinson, attached no significance to that decision al-
though the cases were less than a year apart. As previously indicated, in
Keeler, the defendant sought a writ of prohibition to stay prosecution on
a murder charge. Defendant's wife was thirty-one to thirty-six weeks preg-
nant by another man when defendant forced her to get out of a car and
kicked her in the abdomen intentionally causing the death of the fetus.
The writ of prohibition was denied in the California Court of Appeals,
the court holding that a fetus which has reached that stage of viability
where premature separation would not end the child's life, is a human
being for purposes of a homicide statute within the meaning of the Cali-
fornia law.41 The California Supreme Court reversed, however, concluding
that an unborn but viable infant is not a human being under the California
statute and to hold otherwise would deny the petitioner due process of
law.42 This denial of due process would result from inadequate notice that
California was declaring a viable fetus to be included in the definition of
"person" in its homicide statute. In addition, the court held that to include
37. 153 Ohio St. 529, 92 N.E.2d 809 (1950).
38. W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS ch. 10, § 56 (3d ed. 1964).
39. 8 Cau. L. REP. 2077 (1970).
40. 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1970).
41. Keeler v. Superior Court, 80 Cal. Rptr. 865 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
42. Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 639, 470 P.2d 617, 626, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481,
494 (1970),
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a viable fetus in the homicide statute would contradict the legislative
intent.43 In an attempt to reconcile Keeler with Chavez, the court ignored
the Chavez dicta, which urged the viability test, and redefined that case to
stand for the proposition that a viable fetus in the process of being born
"is a human being within the homicide statute. '4 4 Although the court
might have favored the finding of a homicide in this case, it maintained
that it was the function of the legislature, not the court, to define the term
"human being."43 The California Court of Appeals (California's second
highest court), in failing to confront the due process question of notice,
may have been more concerned with the defendant's mens rea and moral
culpability than with whether the fetus could be the subject of homicide
when it is only weeks away from being born. The California Supreme
Court, however, was interested in determining the exact moment a fetus
is a person, and since the legislature was silent on the question, the court
prohibited the finding of a homicide in a situation where public opinion
might demand such criminal sanctions because of the moral culpability of
the defendant.
IV. STATUTORY APPROACH
A. Early Feticide Statutes
In the nineteenth century, feticide46 statutes came into existence, which
made destruction of the fetus at any stage of development a criminal act;
in some cases, where the fetus was quick, such statutes made destruction
a major crime causing a similar effect as that achieved under homicide
statutes. States which prohibited abortion by specific wording of statutes,
"abolished 'quickening' as an element of the crime while those states which
utilized regular homicide . . . statutes, generally retained that element.147
The latter type of statutes are generally still in effect today and closer
scrutiny (infra) will reveal that they have merely codified the ambiguous
case law of the past and created new problems of their own.
B. Existing Statutes
Florida, Arkansas, Georgia, Michigan, Mississippi and North Dakota
have statutes which state that: "The willful killing of an unborn quick
child, by any injury to the mother of such child which would be murder
43. Id. at 634-35, 470 P.2d at 626-27, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 490-91.
44. Id. at 639, 470 P.2d at 629, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
45. Id. at 629-31, 470 P.2d at 622-24, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 486-88.
46. Feticide is the destruction of a fetus. BLACK'S LAw DicriONARY 748 (4th ed.
1951).
47. Louisell, Abortion, The Practice of Medicine and the Due Process of Law, 16
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 233, 240 (1969).
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if it resulted in the death of such mother shall be deemed manslaughter."48
Not only do these statutes fail to define the word quick, but they do
not provide for unintentional acts, or acts which do not injure the
mother but kill the fetus. Oklahoma similarly restricts the statute to quick
infants but lessens the standard of injury to the mother.40 The South
Carolina statute does not mention the word quick, but it has been judicially
declared to be a requisite.50 Conversely, the New Jersey infanticide statute
has not been interpreted to require quickening, although the penalty for
killing a fetus is up to fifteen years in prison, while states such as New
York, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin have decided to protect the non-quick
fetus and have either provided separate statutes for the purpose or have
specifically included the non-quick fetus in the general feticide act. 1
Not all feticide statutes deal directly with the killing of an unborn
fetus. Illinois and Massachusetts provide criminal penalties for "conceal-
ment of an issue" of the mother's body.5 2 This crime dates back to the
Offenses Against the Person Act of 1861 which made it a crime to conceal
the birth of a child which is either stillborn or alive. 6 Judge Pollock, a
former chief baron of the British Court of Exchequer, has been quoted to
have said that the situation presents "an imaginary crime."'5 4 This type of
statute may very well be an attempt to circumvent the question of when
a fetus becomes d human being. Under the original statute of 1623, the
punishment for such a crime was death. 5 This adds credibility to the
argument that the statute was enacted for fear that the state could not
prove a corpus delicti required in homicide cases; today the crime is pun-
ishable by no more than a one hundred dollar fine or one year in jail.56
The various statutes are inconsistent with each other and what is a
misdemeanor in one state is a serious felony in another. In Georgia, the
courts made it clear that killing an unborn quick child is tantamount to
murder and such an act would be punished by death or life imprisonment.5 7
Yet, in New Hampshire that same defendant could kill a quick infant
48. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2223 (1964); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.09 (1965); GA. CODE
ANN. g. 26-9921a (1969); MxcH. STAT. ANN. § 750.322 (1968); MIss. CODE ANN. § 2222
(1966); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12-25-03 (1960).
49. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 713 (1951).
50. State v. Steadman, 214 S.C. 1, 51 S.E.2d 91 (1948), considering S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-82 (1962).
51. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.40 (McKinney 1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4718;
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.04 (1958). For the New Jersey interpretation of its statute, see In
re Vince, 2 N.J. 443, 67 A.2d 141 (1949), considering N.J. STAT. ANN. ch. 2A: 87-1 (1957).
52. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-4 (1964); MAss. GEN. LAWs ch. 272, § 22 (1959).
53. See G. WILLIAMs, supra note 4, at 10.
54. Id. at 11.
55. Id. at 10.
56. MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 272, § 22 (1959).
57. Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 715, 87 S.E.2d 100, 102 (1955).
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with the same mens rea, and be fined not more than one thousand dollars
or imprisoned not more than ten years.& 8 One explanation for this incon-
sistency could be that Georgia views the killing of a quick child as a crime
against the fetus, while New Hampshire's statute is merely to protect the
mother from the adverse effects of an abortion.
There is another interesting aspect in those states which have liberal-
ized abortion laws. What would happen, for example, if an attempted legal
abortion resulted in the live birth of the child and the child died sometime
after as a result of the attempted abortion? At common law, if a per-
son attempting to procure an abortion causes the child to be born alive
in such a state that it can only live for a short time, it is murder59 One
commentator, discussing proposals for justifiable abortion, said, "[t]he
offense might well become ordinary murder if the child should happen to
survive for a moment after it has been expelled from the body of its
mother."60
V. AMBIGUITY OF TERMS
A. Recent Trends
Legislators and courts have consistently disagreed over the proper
phrasing for feticide statutes and the correct definition of a "person" in
homicide statutes. It is not surprising, therefore, that the only thing they
could agree on was that there existed an ambiguity and vagueness of terms.61
This lack of clarity was particularly apparent in statutes which provided
non-criminal justification for the killing of a fetus. In People v. Belous,6 2
defendant was convicted of violating section 274 of the California Penal
Code which prior to the 1967 amendment read:
Every person who provides, supplies, or administers to any woman,
or procures any woman to take any medicine, drug, or substance,
or uses or employs any instrument or other means whatever, with
intent thereby to procure the miscarriage of such woman, unless
58. N.H. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 585:13 (1955).
59. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 5 n.3.
60. Barnard, An Analysis and Criticism of the Model Penal Code Provisions on the
Law of Abortion, 18 CASE W. Es. L. REv. 540, 555 n.86 (1967). For a state such as New
York, which has a liberalized abortion law (N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.05(3) (McKinney
1967), as amended (1970)) it is probably hoped that the courts will never have to face
that problem, yet the day of reckoning may be approaching. On September 11, 1970, an
attempted abortion in New York Hospital - Cornell Medical Center had resulted in the
live birth of one of a set of twins. The infant died after living independently of the
mother for fifteen hours. Buffalo Evening News, Sept. 11, 1970, at 14, col. 2. Although
no criminal charges may be brought because the abortion was legal under state law, this
event serves to illustrate the shortcomings of an abortion statute such as New York's,
where an infant capable of existing outside the mother could legally be destroyed.
61. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 59, 227 A.2d 689, 709 (1967) (dissenting
opinion).
62. 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1969).
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the same is necessary to preserve her life, is punishable by im-
prisonment in the State prison not less than two nor more than
five years.63
The California Supreme Court, reversing the lower court, held that "'neces-
sary to preserve' in section 274 of the Penal Code is not susceptible of a
construction that does not violate legislative intent and that is sufficiently
certain to satisfy due process requirements." 64 The trend in the law today
is to repudiate ambiguous terms which attempt to determine what crime,
if any, has been committed in the killing of an unborn fetus. A federal
court, in United States v. Vuitch,65 held a similar type of statute to be un-
constitutionally vague, in failing to define the word "health." The Belous
and Vuitch decisions render "similar statutes in forty-four states ... vulner-
able to constitutional challenge." 66 Commenting on this trend, one writer
has speculated that "[i]t will be impossible to predict which word . . . a
court may choose to attack next."67 It may not be very long before courts
consider the constitutionality of terms such as "quickness" or "viable" as
used in feticide statutes.
In criminal statutes, there must be a reasonable degree of certainty:
"No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as
to the meaning of penal statutes." 68 It is arguable that due process requires
rules of "sufficient objectivity."69 "[A] statute [that] either forbids or re-
quires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates
the first essential of due process of law." 70 How could non-professionals
agree to the correct meanings of "quick" or "viable" when men of science
and medicine are totally at odds over their application?
There are at least sixteen states that require the infant to be quick in
order for it to be the subject of a feticide statute.71 Yet, the word quick
is vague and ambiguous and does not lend itself readily to interpretation;
"[fjactors such as obesity, excessive accumulation of amniotic fluid ... or
[mere] ignorance of the mother may [deter] recognition [of quickening]." 72
63. CAL. PENAL CODE § 274 (West 1954) (emphasis added).
64. 458 P.2d 194, 197, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 357 (1969).
65. 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969).
66. Comment, 15 N.Y.L.F. 941, 942 (1969).
67. Id. at 949.
68. People v. Belous, 458 P.2d 194, 197, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 357 (1969).
69. Note, Due Process Requirements of Definiteness in Statutes, 62 HAtv. L. REv.
77 (1948).
70. People v. Belous, 458 P.2d 194, 197, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 357 (1969).
71. These states include: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Michigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Okla.
homa, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.
q2. Mietus & Mietus, Criminal Abortion: "A Failure of Law" or a Challenge to
Society?, 51 A.B.A.J. 924, 925 (1965).
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"[Fetal movements are not experienced by some pregnant women at any
time" and in others, fetal movements such as tumbling, kicking and hiccup-
ping "are sensed only during the final months" of pregnancy.73 Some courts
as early as 1909 rejected the notion of quickening and declared, as the
Oregon Court has, that statutes which provide for manslaughter in the
intentional death of a fetus, cover the entire period of gestation.7 4
B. Viability
Viability is, for similar reasons, too vague to be used either in criminal
statutes or as a factor in determining what, if any, crime has been com-
mitted when a fetus is destroyed. Jurisdictions that have used viability as a
standard will have to re-evaluate their positions in the light of new medical
evidence. Scientists have already made major progress in keeping ten week
old fetuses alive and "are working toward the day when it will become
routine to save prematurely aborted fetuses at almost any age and carry
them through to 'birth' in artificial wombs." 75 It would be no help to at-
tach the requirement of an independent circulation to the definition of
viability. "[W]ithin a month of conception, the embryonic heart is main-
taining the fetal bloodstream, which at no [time] is directly communicating
with the maternal blood . . . ;" nor would it be any help to require an
inflated lung or continued action of the heart for these tests give contra-
dictory conclusions.76 In Gleitman v. Cosgrove, the court noted the fact
that even "thirty years ago . . . the increase in knowledge of embryology
had revealed that the infant has separate existence from the moment of
conception."7' There is overwhelming evidence to show that the inde-
pendent existence of the fetus appears at a time which is much before the
recognized period of viability (usually the 24-26 week), yet the term viable
supposedly represents the fetus at its truly independent state.78 "The fetus,
even viewed by [a] ... layman, has ... developed many of the 'character-
istics and recognizable features of humanity' by the fourth month;" 79 to a
specialist, however, identification of independent characteristics of human-
ity can be made during the first two months of development, and therefore
it may appear that the fetus is capable of an independent existence at an
early stage. The argument is often made that a fetus in the early months is
not indepedent of its mother because it is completely contingent, yet, "it is
73. Id.
74. State v. Atwood, 54 Ore. 526, 531, 102 P. 295, 297 (1909).
75. Byrne, The Legal Rights of The Unborn Child, 41 Los ANGELES BAR BuL.. 24,
68 (1965).
76. Atkinson, Life, Birth, and Live-birth, 20 L.Q. REv. 134, 154 (1904), cited in G.
WLLAMS, supra note 4, at 7.
77. 49 N.J. 22, 36 n.3, 227 A.2d 689, 696 n.3 (1967) (concurring opinion).
78. People v. Chavez, 77 Cal. App. 2d 625-26, 176 P.2d 92, 94 (4th Dist. 1947).
79. Mietus 8: Mietus, supra note 72.
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... complete and integrated in terms of its essential [development]." With
respect to full development after birth, the infant is likewise a "compara-
tively ...inchoate creature."80 In addition, the infant that is one week old
is not more significantly independent than the unborn infant since "the
human [species] after birth requires years of [critical] attention for survival,
[and] for as long as twenty years, the child remains dependent on [his]
parents for food, shelter and other needs."81 Thus, for reasons such as
these, it may not be long before the words "quick" and "viable" are declared
unconstitutionally vague.
Recent decisions have reaffirmed the judicial determination to seek
carity in criminal statutes.8a To avoid the problem of ambiguity, states
may use the New York abortion statute as a prototype. It states that an
abortion cannot be performed after the twenty-fourth week of pregnancy.83
Although this type of statute is not ambiguous it may be arbitrary for there
is nothing unique about the twenty-fourth week as opposed to the twenty-
third week and sixth day. In addition, it may not be desirable since it does
not adequately deal with the situations presented in Dickinson, where
defendant's acts were unintentional (the statute concerns intentional de-
struction of fetus), or Keeler, where the public may demand more than
saimple prosecution for abortion, due to the high moral culpability of the
defendant.
VI. DoEs THE FETUS POSSESS ANY RIGHTS
TiAT Mus-r BE CONSIDERED?
It is becoming apparent that what is needed is a statute that would
adequately deal with the broadly different Keeler and Dickinson situations
and at the same -time provide for policy considerations, such as the trend
toward liberalized abortion. Yet, before this can be attempted, it is neces-
sary to determine if there are any rights possessed by the fetus that must not
be overlooked in the shaping of such a statute. The law has usually held
that Mr. X can sacrifice the life of Mr. Y if Mr. Y is threatening him with
deadly force and there is no other way to affect Y's presence nor any other
way that Mr. X could extricate himself from the situation. The reason the
law only allows Mr. X to use deadly force in certain situations is because Mr.
Y has certain rights which preclude Mr. X from killing him at will. In the
case of a fetus, no adequate statute could be drafted unless there was a
determination as to whether the fetus is entitled to the same minimal
rights. If such a determination is in the affirmative, then the ability of Mr.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See United States v. Matthews, 419 F.2d 1177, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Scott v.
District Attorney, 309 F. Supp. 833, 836 (E.D. La. 1970).
83. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05 (3) (McKinney Supp. 1970).
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X to kill the fetus must be justified on the basis of policy considerations; if
the determination is in the negative, then there is no need for justification
since the fetus has no right to live.
The law is not dear as to whether the fetus is entitled to such rights.
"It is ... a well established rule of law that an infant is in being from the
time of conception for the purpose of taking any estate which is for its
benefit."8 4 In Mitchell v. Commonwealth,8 5 the court said:
That the child shall be considered in existence from the moment of
conception for the protection of its rights of property, and yet not
in existence, until four or five months after inception of its being,
to the extent that it is a crime not to destroy it, presents an anomaly
in the law that ought to be provided against by the law making
department of the government.
In the area of tort law, the courts have already allowed damages for prenatal
injuries that have occurred in non-viable and non-quick infants. In Daley
v. Meier,86 the Appellate Court of Illinois held that an infant can maintain
an action to recover for prenatal injuries even if it has not reached the
stage of viability.8 7 In New York, the courts have allowed infants to sue for
prenatal injuries that occurred prior to quickening.88 In New York, the
infant also has other rights under the Estates Powers and Trust Law 9 and
the Domestic Relations Law.90 It is arguable, although doubtful, that to
confer various rights to the fetus under some laws requires that it be subject
to the equal protection of all laws. Additionally, there are those who con-
tend that the "lives of the mother and child [are] separate and distinct from
the moment of conception, and from that point on, the child is entitled to
the 'inalienable rights granted by the Creator and embodied in the U.S.
Constitution'."'9 1 New York State Assistant Attorney General Joel Leivittes
has declared: "The state has an interest in the protection of the unborn
child that overrides any other personal rights that the laws might otherwise
be deemed to threaten."92 Professor David Louisell of the University of
California School of Law at Berkeley has said:
84. Note, 2 SuFFOru U.L. REv. 228, 230 (1968). See also Deal v. Sexton, 144 N.C.
157, 56 S.E. 691, 692 (1907).
85. 78 Ky. 204, 209 (1879).
86. 33 Ill. App. 2d 218, 178 N.E.2d 691 (1961).
87. Id. at 224, 178 N.E.2d at 694.
88. Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (3rd Dep't 1953).
89. N.Y. Er., PoWERs & TRusrs LAW § 2-1.3 (McKinney 1967), provides that
"[c]hildren conceived before, but born alive after .. . [a] disposition" of property by a
testator, shall be allowed to take such property.
90. N.Y. DoM. RF.L. LAW § 81 (McKinney 1964) provides that "a child likely to be
born" has a right to have his interests protected by a guardian, selected by one of the
infant's parents.
91. Hanley, The Rights of the Unborn Child, 25 TRANs. PAc. COAST. Ons. GYN. Soc.
1 (1957), cited in Leavy, & Kummer, Criminal Abortion: Human Hardship and Un-
yielding Laws 35 S. CAL. L. REv. 123, 132 n.59 (1962).
92. N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1970. § 6 (Magazine), at 90.
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If the child's right to life is to be weighed for example against a
parent's desire to avoid the prospect of a gravely defective child,
the ethos of our law would seem to require that the scales bejudicial ones, which should register decision only after due process
of law. The unborn child, like the infant after birth and like a
defendant, even one whose guilt is a serious crime may appear
obvious-is entitled to representation.93
Perhaps the most obvious inconsistency in the law with respect to rights
of the fetus is the common law rule prohibiting execution of a female
convict who is quick with a child. This is the law in many jurisdictions,
including New York,94 which has a liberalized abortion law that allows
the destruction of the fetus, with the consent of the mother, up to the
twenty-fourth week of pregnancy.95 Quickening "usually occurs about the
eighteenth week," 96 so in effect, New York seems to sanction the killing of a
fetus between the eighteenth and twenty-fourth week of pregnancy which
it simultaneously declares has a right to live by forbidding the execution of
a female convict who is quick with child.97
It could be argued that the rights provided for by the United States
Constitution were meant to benefit a "person" in the common use of the
word, which could be defined as "the body of a human being as presented
to public view ... with its appropriate coverings and clothing."9 8 Since the
nineteenth century, however, the law has conferred such rights on "artificial"
persons. In Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R.R., 0 the Supreme
Court held that a corporation is entitled to the right of equal protection
which is guaranteed to persons in the United States Constitution. This
holding has been reaffirmed in Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. John-
son,100 and Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander,o1 both cases involving a
corporation's right to equal protection. The conclusion should be apparent
that another "artificial" person, namely a fetus, which certainly resembles
a human being more than a corporation does, should have at least as many
constitutional rights.
93. R- CooKE, THE TERRIBLE CHoxcE: THE ABORTION DamaraA 2 (1968), quoting
Professor Louisel1.
94. See Means, supra note 7, at 443, where this assumption is made.
95. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05 (3) (McKinney Supp. 1970).
96. See Mietus & Mietus, supra note 72.
97. See Means, supra note 7, at 443.
98. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTONARY 1686 (unabr. 1967).
99. 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
100. 303 U.S. 77 (1937).
101. 337 U.S. 562 (1948).
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VII. THE ELEMENTS OF AN ADEQUATE STATUTE
A. Justifications
From the foregoing discussion, it can be assumed that the fetus
possesses certain rights and more importantly it cannot be destroyed, absent
sufficient justification. This justification, if determined, should be codified
along with an explicit statement of what crime is committed by violating
such a statute. Further, codification in the past has failed to account for
situations such as in Keeler and Dickinson, where the intentions and moral
turpitude of the actor should have been a significant factor in determining
what crime was committed. A statute embodying the above mentioned
principles would require two provisions: the first expressing the circum-
stances that justify the killing of a fetus and the second establishing the
crimes that are chargeable for an unjustified killing.
The circumstances under which the killing of a fetus might be justified
are a function of public policy. For example, killing the fetus may be
justified in light of a public policy which gives the mother's life a higher
priority than the life of the fetus, 102 to save the life of the mother and
thereby destroy the fetus if a choice had to be made. The first part of a
statute reflecting this policy, might therefore read that it is unlawful to
intentionally or unintentionally cause the death of an unborn child, unless
the continued existence of such child will cause the death of the mother,
from a condition that is beyond her control. An attempt to construct a
statute reflecting the aforementioned policy must overcome the problems
created by People v. Belous °3 (an abortion case which is relevant only to
illustrate the necessity of using precise language in a penal statute) which
declared the phrase "necessary to preserve" the life of the mother void for
vagueness. The nature of the justification must be stated precisely.
Another policy justification might be the consent of the mother to the
killing of a fetus. Further, momentarily disregarding the validity of abortion
as a justification, if it was considered to be a just reason (as in New York),
an added justification might be where the mother has consented to the
death of such child and the unborn fetus is less than twenty-four weeks old.
The restriction "less than twenty-four weeks old" is inserted solely because
of the risk involved to the mother in an abortion performed beyond the
twenty-fourth week, and not because of a possible contention that a fetus
at that stage closely resembles a "person."'10 4
102. People v. Belous, 458 P.2d 194, 203, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 863 (1969).
103. Id. at 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 354.
104. That the infant's right to live should be a function of the mother's will is
an unacceptable premise. Professor David Louisell repudiates the notion that liberalized
qbortion is justified on the basis of policy considerations and maintains that "easy legal
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
An individual state legislature will also be faced with the basic policy
choices that flow from the quickening and viability tests. For example, a
legislature is certainly free to consider the destruction of a quick child
differently from the destruction of a non-quick child. It must be remem-
bered, however, that, as previously discussed, policy choices involving the
classic tests (of quickening, independent existence and viability) are almost
inevitably, and perhaps unavoidably, arbitrary.
B. Determination of What Crime Has Been Committed
A, second provision of an adequate feticide statute will have to account
for situations such as those found in Keeler and in Dickinson. Both Keeler
and Dickinson were possessed of a moral turpitude that could have served
as the criminal intent required for the commission of a crime. The difficulty
in these cases is a product of the courts' attempt to fit the facts into the
'confines of homicide statutes that were inadequate. Our legislatures must
first adopt statutes addressed to the problem of the killing of an unborn
child in light of the aforementioned policy considerations. Having deter-
mined when the destruction of an unborn child is a crime, it then becomes
necessary to shift the analysis to the effects of the actor's moral turpitude or
criminal intent. To adequately handle the divergent situations found in
Keeler and Dickinson, the determination of what crime was committed
shoild give cognizance to the defendant's culpability. Thus, for violating
the prohibition of this kind of statute, the defendant could be guilty of (a)
murder, if he intentionally causes the death of an unborn infant, (b) man-
slaughter, if with intent to cause serious physical injury to the unborn
infant or to another person, he causes the death of such infant while he is
abortion presents a genuine and disturbing reversal of law's steady progress toward
recognition of the dignity, value and essential equality of human life." Louisell, Abortion,
Vie Practice of Medicine and The Due Process of Law, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 233, 253
(1969). New York State Assistant Attorney General Joel Leivittes argues that "the basic
right of the fetus to state protection, similar to that given fully developed human
beings, also overrides whatever right the woman may have to control the use of her
body. It is at once naive and dangerous to contend that such an absolute right (abortion
on demand) flows from the sovereign right of females over their own bodies." N.Y.
Times, Jan. 25, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 90.
It is often argued that abortion is justifiable because the fetus may never develop
to a viable stage or that the prohibition of it may force the pregnant woman to go to
a quack doctor. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11 Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
"Eighty-five percent of all those pregnancies which are not deliberately aborted, pro-
ceed to the point of viability. ... "; in addition, the argument is not valid traditionally
since the law has never justified the destruction of a human being on the basis that his
chances for survival are "uncertain." Byrn, Abortion in Perspective, 5 DUQUESNE L. Rrv.
125, 133 (1966). In response to the deterrence argument, it is recognized in the criminal
law that "where fundamental human values are at stake, law must be judged by other
criteria than its mere effectiveness in preventing crime." Editoriaj, Morality and Policy,
112 AMERICA 521, (1965), cited in Note, 31 ALBANY L. REv. 290, 295 (1967).
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acting under ar extreme emotional disturbance, (c) negligent homicide, if
he unintentionally causes the death of such unborn infant, under circum-
stances that constitute gross negligence or recklessness. Of course, all de-
fenses that are usually provided for by the state in its homicide statute could
apply here (e.g., insanity).
VIII. SUMMARY
Statutes and case law (particularly the Chavez and Singleton cases) con-
cerned with the killing of an unborn infant have been ambiguous and
inequitable, and have given rise to decisions such as Keeler and Dickinson.
This can be expected to continue as long as legal writers and courts con-
tinue to debate over "when a fetus becomes a human being." There is
adequate authority and reason to declare that the fetus has at least some
rights, particularly the right to be born unless there is sufficient justification
to the contrary. This comment has set forth possible justifications which
may vary depending on the public policy of the particular State involved.
The essence of the statutory scheme proposed here is that it shifts the re-
sponsibility for determination of the legal status of the unborn child to the
policy-making body and would for the first time in the context of a feticide
statute take cognizance of the culpability of the actor.
HowARD J. LEVINE

